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Transatlantic Relations: the Long Holiday from His-
tory is Over 
Heather A. Conley
 
Transatlantically, we have been fortunate to enjoy a very 
long, 70-year holiday from history. Europe thought it had 
once and for all overcome the devastation and trauma of 
two catastrophic wars by creating an organization, the 
European Union (EU), which could subjugate negative 
international and political forces with economic integration, 
institutions and consensus-building processes. The United 
States (US) equally believed that it had sufficiently 
overcome its historically isolationist tendencies by 
remaining outwardly facing and globally engaged during 
and after the Cold War.  
Internally, American and European democracies are 
struggling to regain their confidence economically in light of 
dramatic change brought about by rapid globalization and 
increased migration. This struggle is exemplified by the 
ascent of ‘illiberal democracy’ as embodied by Prime 
Minister Orbán in Hungary, who has altered Hungarian 
democracy to remain in power, and by the anti-immigrant 
politics of Italian Deputy Prime Minister Salvini.  In the US, 
there is a rising tide of racial anger and societal division 
which is encouraged by its President as institutions and 
transparency are challenged. Both the US and the EU are 
turning inward and are less capable of addressing external, 
great power challenges.   
This policy brief first investigates the revitalization of great 
power competition in a changing world, how the EU and the 
US are adjusting to this transition, and the difficult choices 
which must be made transatlantically in order to build a 
new international system based on democratic principles 
and the rule of law. 
Great power transition: historical antecedents 
The clues to states’ behaviour in contexts of geopolitical stress 
may be found in the 1848 revolutions, the post-1919 interwar 
period in Europe, and the post-WWII period.   
Europe in 1848 represented a time when nationalism, self-de-
termination, and reform efforts accompanied a period of 
great technological change. Reformist forces clashed with the 
ruling concepts of traditional values and conservatism. De-
spite the desire for reform, conservatism won out, but re-
mained deeply traumatized by the experience, vowing to pre-
vent progressive forces from returning.  
However, the calls for change did not stop; they were only de-
layed and grew stronger. The desire for change confronted the 
structural rigidity of the international system at that time and 
Executive Summary 
> Following seven decades of global engagement, 
the US is returning to its natural state of retrench-
ment, but encumbered by an expansive global 
military footprint and alliance structure. The US 
must decide whether to maintain these outward 
facing structures, allow them to go fallow, or re-
treat from them entirely. 
> The United States and the European Union seek 
the benefits of a benevolent and stable global or-
der which was underwritten in large part by the 
US, but neither of them wishes to shoulder to-
day’s increasingly high costs of maintaining that 
order and enforcing its many rules. 
> The EU is increasingly caught in the middle of 
great power competition between the US, China, 
and Russia, and its post-modern structures seem 
inadequate to the task. The EU must make 
choices about whether it will continue to work 
with the US or seek greater accommodation with 
outside powers.  
> There will be strong impulses for the EU and the 
US to go their separate transatlantic ways as 
great power competition and its regional mani-
festations become more dynamic and old multi-
lateral structures and institutions seem unable to 
respond. However, in an era of such power com-
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it simmered for decades until it fully matured into conflict by 
1914.   
The 1919 Paris Agreement and the 1920 Treaty of Trianon 
ended World War I and destroyed three empires which had 
each been extremely resistant to reform. New nations were 
birthed, and a new world order was forged by the great pow-
ers in 1919, known as the ‘Big Four’: the US, the UK, France, 
and Italy. Failing spectacularly in their effort to build and main-
tain international stability through the League of Nations and 
self-determination, the US quickly returned to its isolationist 
posture, Germany regained its strength and an aggrieved Italy 
joined Germany. The victorious powers found themselves 
back at war twenty years later.  
At the end of World War II, another great power combination, 
known as the ‘Four Powers’ – the US, the UK, France, and the 
Soviet Union – gathered in Berlin to rule over a defeated Ger-
many. Those Powers failed to catalyse stability again as one of 
the great four – the Soviet Union – sought to divide Germany 
and Europe for itself, quickly leading to the outbreak of the 
Cold War. It was the decision by the US to shore up the UK, 
France and the rest of Europe against the Soviet Union, ma-
ture its World War II alliance system and create durable inter-
national institutional structures (e.g., Bretton Woods, United 
Nations, and NATO) that delivered the stability and security 
we have largely enjoyed for the past 70 years. This era, how-
ever, ended about a decade ago with the advent of the global 
economic crisis and the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008.     
This brief history lesson suggests strong patterns: victorious 
and/or dominant powers seek to define and control an emerg-
ing new order. Aggrieved powers seek to alter that world or-
der. As the old and more brittle order is tested, the victorious 
powers cling to the traditions and systems they know, 
wrapped in their own national interpretation of history, iden-
tity, and sense of place. Aggrieved or assertive powers whose 
ambitions are constrained by that order seek a new system 
which better suits their prerogatives.  
Therefore, the need for reform of the international system be-
comes even greater when the victorious powers resist change.  
Even powers which have eventually emerged victorious (e.g., 
Central European after the fall of Communism) can easily fall 
back to historical aggrievement and victimization by drawing 
strength from the past to better withstand the growing de-
mand for change and transparency by society. For example, 
much of Central Europe is reclaiming the post-1919 period as 
part of its modern national perspective. This is evident in the 
current Polish government’s desire to re-animate its ‘Inter-
marium’ regional policy of leadership of Central Europe with a 
dual anti-Russian and anti-German perspective based on his-
torical grievances. This is also why Hungarian regional policy is 
based on ethno-nationalism and an attempt to reconstitute it-
self based on historic grievances of a lost post-Trianon Hun-
gary. Unique to this historic moment, the US government is 
projecting a sense of aggrievement over the cost and burden 
of global leadership for the past 70 years.   
This experience can be instructive to understand today’s great 
power competition, which is intensified and amplified by the 
speed of geopolitical, societal, and technological change.  
Today’s ‘Great Transition’ 
The past 30 years post-Cold War – and especially the last ten 
years since the onset of the economic crisis – mark the era of 
the ‘Great Transition’. Others have referred to it as the ‘Great 
Disruption’. This period has been shaped by the United States, 
China and Russia seeking to define the new international or-
der by asserting themselves in patient and persistent as well 
as erratic and highly unpredictable ways. Meanwhile, Europe 
is not seeking to shape the new order; it seems to be clinging 
to the old system while increasingly succumbing to the whims 
of more assertive nations. Described as ‘vassalage’ by French 
Finance Minister Le Maire, this is the first time in nearly a mil-
lennium that Europe has been absent from great power com-
petition. To avoid this, Le Maire has recently argued that there 
must be a ‘new empire of Europe’, which can affirm its politi-
cal power and protect its economic interests (Mallet 2019).  
Predictive historic modelling suggests that the United States 
will seek to return to a semi-state of isolation while using its 
economic and military strength to align the future world order 
to its interests (Haass 2019). Russia, as always, will continue to 
resist internal reform until it again collapses – as it did in 1917 
(Gurganus & Rumer 2019). The Kremlin will likely continue to 
pursue its expansionist and disruptive policies to mask its in-
ternal decline and simultaneously attempt to reinforce a great 
power mandate by challenging US leadership of the interna-
tional system and aligning increasingly with China. China has 
fully returned to the world stage after a prolonged absence. 
Chinese President Xi Jinping pursues a policy of using the cur-
rent international system to China’s advantage to achieve 
state-controlled global economic and technological domi-
nance and regional hegemony while ensuring the survival of 
its state-controlled political system (Glaser 2019).  
The United States and Europe have reacted differently to this 
‘Great Transition’. 
The US and Europe: facing the ‘Great Transition’ 
As the US slowly returns to its pre-WWI state of retrenchment, 
it continues to maintain a robust global military footprint and 
alliance structure. However, these two forces are incompati-
ble over the long term. Therefore, the US must decide on 
whether to maintain these outward-facing structures, allow 
them to go fallow, or retreat from them entirely. At the end of 
World War II, the US believed that Europe was so weakened 
that it could not resolve its internal instability alone as its 
weakness made it very susceptible to Communism and Soviet 
control. The US viewed European stability as essential to its 
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national security and therefore global stability at the begin-
ning of the Cold War, and thus acquiesced to a role of security 
provider by becoming a European power.  
At the end of the Cold War, the US logically began to retrench 
by reducing its physical security presence in Europe (ironically 
lowering its military presence to its nadir by 2014, the year 
when Russia illegally annexed Crimea, only to have US forces 
return quickly back to Europe). While it reduced its presence 
in NATO countries, the US had to expand its power outside of 
NATO, first in the Balkans in the mid- to late 1990s, then in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and eventually Syria, and now in the Indo-
Pacific region. At the same time, the US fully supported the 
expansion of NATO into Central and Eastern Europe, which 
also expanded America’s security umbrella. This twenty-five-
year period of military expansionism changed the nature and 
form of US foreign policy. American diplomacy has become 
militarized in nearly every sense of the word. US Ambassadors 
are more likely to be former generals and admirals than re-
gional specialists from the Foreign Service. The Defense De-
partment’s budget expanded while the diplomatic and devel-
opment assistance budgets, already a small percentage of US 
government spending, shrunk. Domestic resentment has 
grown over this budgetary and military expansion when other 
domestic funding needs are unmet. Political polarization has 
also crept into nearly all elements of US foreign and security 
policy, most recently to include US policy toward Israel and 
Russia. This polarization has become so great that America’s 
allies and adversaries no longer trust Washington when it joins 
a treaty or signs a trade agreement. Policy pursuits change 
dramatically between US administrations. America’s adver-
saries exploit these policy seams and weaknesses whenever 
possible.  
Perhaps the most singularly unique feature of America’s cur-
rent retrenchment has been Washington’s proactive distanc-
ing from its modern narrative as a champion of democracy, 
rule of law, human rights, civil society, and the dignity of the 
individual. America, as a “shining city on the hill” historically 
served as a democratic beacon for other nations (Reagan 
1984). The current Administration selectively uses democratic 
principles to support its policy preferences (e.g., Iran, Vene-
zuela) but characterizes the United States as being victimized 
and disadvantaged by other countries; it currently has 
adopted a negative self-assessment, particularly of its interna-
tionalism and multilateral engagement, despite claiming that 
it is becoming or already is ‘great again’ (Gambino & Pankha-
nia 2016). 
Despite long-standing US engagement, Europe continues to 
be burdened by self-inflicted traumas of the 20th century, 
which have produced fear and a rejection of power. Freed 
from the threat of the Cold War, Europe, like the US, made a 
strategic miscalculation in the 1990s. It expected a permanent 
benign security environment protected by its security depend-
ency on the US. It concentrated on erasing internal borders 
but did not sufficiently strengthen its expanding external bor-
ders. It did not anticipate Russian aggression or near-perma-
nent instability in the Middle East and Africa, which would 
cause large waves of migrants seeking safety in Europe. Ra-
ther, the EU focused its strength on institutional development, 
particularly the monetary union, enlargement, and its com-
mon foreign and security policy. As crises and challenges 
struck, half-formed institutions struggled to cope with internal 
and external challenges, which only served to intensify in-
ward-looking institutional development. Even Europe’s great-
est strength, its economic weight and the power of its single 
market, is now being sorely tested by the United Kingdom’s 
wish to leave the EU, by China’s desire for global economic 
domination, by US trade and tariff policies, and by EU mem-
bers such as Italy seeking reprieve from EU fiscal and mone-
tary rules.    
Transatlantically, both the US and Europe seek the benefits of 
a benevolent and stable global order, but neither still wishes 
to shoulder the increasingly high costs of maintaining that or-
der or enforcing its many rules. This is also the ‘Brexit lens’ by 
which many in the UK view the EU: gain the economic benefits 
but avoid the necessary costs. As former Foreign Secretary 
and current Prime Minister Boris Johnson succinctly summa-
rized, “Our policy is having our cake and eating it” (Newton 
Dunn 2016). And increasingly, this is US President Trump’s 
view of the costs of alliances and ‘rent owed’ by allies, partic-
ularly NATO and nations that host US forces.   
The future: great power competition and its sources 
The ‘Great Transition’ that is unfolding seems to imply a dura-
ble return to great power competition and balance of power 
politics where all instruments of power – hard and soft – will 
be deployed in the pursuit of enhancing national strength and 
achieving national interests. Looking to the future, it is im-
portant to understand which sources various powers – espe-
cially the US and the EU – can mobilise in this competition. 
National power is still largely defined by economic, military, 
and ideational strength. In the United States, for the first time 
in 30 years, all three areas of national power as well as its alli-
ance system are being simultaneously challenged from the 
outside – by Russia and China in particular – and from within. 
As during the Cold War, there is more dynamic interaction be-
tween the great powers regionally; however, while the Cold 
War was a bipolar proxy fight, the hallmark of the emerging 
era will be multi-power proxy interaction. Recent important 
examples of multi-power competition can be seen in Syria, 
Venezuela, Afghanistan, the Arctic, and the Western Balkans 
where the US, Russia, and China – with occasional interjection 
by regional powers such as Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf States – 
are in competition with one another for influence using a va-
riety of economic and military tools, frequently by proxy 
forces. For the foreseeable future, the international system 
will be characterized by such dynamism and complexity. 
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How do the great powers stack up in their cumulative national 
power as we move further into this era? Certainly, the US to-
day is strong economically and militarily, but it is testing its 
own economic buoyancy with harmful trade policies; its mili-
tary readiness has undergone great strain for the past 18 
years; and it has substantially reduced its ideational power, ar-
guably the greatest asset amplifying its military and economic 
strength. Russia has economically stagnated, heralding its 
long-term decline. The Russian regime has chosen to channel 
its remaining national strength into its military capabilities and 
internal security services to ward off internal unrest and ex-
ternal threats to regime survival. Yet, it has also developed an 
ideational narrative – so-called ‘Putinism’ –, which promotes 
President Putin as the only defender of Russia and Russia as 
the great defender of traditional and conservative values (Elt-
chaninoff 2015). China’s re-emergence on the international 
stage has come through its economic strength and supple use 
of international organizations accompanied by a more robust 
regional military presence. Its ideational power is its assertion 
that a great power can decouple economic strength from 
democratic principles, which gains great appeal as a growing 
number of national leaders seek long-term control. Like Putin-
ism, China’s ultimate ideation concentrates on the survivabil-
ity of its leader, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and his thoughts 
(Xi Thought), which is simply internal consolidation by another 
name (The Economist 2018). 
Finally, the European Union and its single market are econom-
ically powerful but remain militarily weak. Its ideational 
strength is backward-looking, founded on institutional con-
struction since the mid-1990s. Europe clings to its narrative 
that post-modern structures and soft power imperatives will 
be successful, yet it has been unable to find its footing in a new 
balance of power and increasingly nationalistic and digitalized 
world. In its defence, however, it is only Japan and the EU that 
are attempting to uphold international laws, norms, and mul-
tilateral policy solutions at this point in time – but, ultimately, 
they are insufficient without the United States.  
By examining the relative economic, military, and ideational 
strengths and weaknesses of the EU, US, China, and Russia, it 
is clear that great power competition has returned and that 
these nations are restructuring and realigning with other pow-
ers in response to this new dynamic. The different prioritiza-
tions of economic, military, and ideational power by these 
world powers will doubtless lead to future clashes in all three 
arenas. Furthermore, with the US returning to isolationism, 
the international system as a whole is threatened, thereby 
creating a vacuum for these competing global interests. 
Transatlantic relations and the future global order 
Henry Kissinger wrote in 1994 that what was “new about the 
emerging world order is that, for the first time, the United 
States can neither withdraw from the world nor dominate it” 
(Kissinger 1994: 19). Over the past 25 years, the US largely 
dominated the world order, and with this dominance came 
the expectation that it would last. Yet the US emphasis in the 
post-September 11th context on countering terrorism and vi-
olent extremism in South Asia and the Middle East led to over-
extension at the same moment that China grew more promi-
nent in the international system by positioning itself as a 
global economic actor and taking on a regional hegemonic 
role. The rapid pace of globalization, the 2008 economic crisis, 
and subsequent global migration crisis have fuelled a public 
desire for the US to return to greater isolationism. As a result, 
the US is currently deliberating what to do with a 70-year-old 
international alliance architecture and its extensive treaty ob-
ligations, as Russia dramatically recalibrates its foreign and se-
curity policy in opposition to the US and the West. It is unclear 
how much the US will choose to challenge its own internation-
ally constructed international system, which was founded for 
European stability and with European support. 
Rather than choose to be fully part of and supportive of the 
existing international system or to return to isolationism, the 
US is attempting to have it both ways: performing minimal and 
inconsistent maintenance of the international system while 
simultaneously testing allies and norms as well as accommo-
dating adversaries. This is confusing for both allies and adver-
saries, which are frequently equated in the Trump administra-
tion’s world view.  
As America contemplates, Europe is increasingly caught in the 
middle of the three powers, with its post-modern structures 
inadequate to the task. The EU is strategically confused, des-
perate to return to the way it was, which is impossible, and 
realizing that the deep scars of the 20th century lie closer to its 
political surface than imagined. It must make choices about 
whether it will continue to work with the US as it confronts 
growing authoritarianism externally and internally or opt for 
other partnerships. At this point, it seems unclear whether the 
EU will seek to accommodate Russian and Chinese interests 
against American interests, be forced to ultimately side with 
the United States, or attempt to brave great power competi-
tion alone. Much of this depends on US support, or lack 
thereof, of the international system moving forward.  
Iran may be a harbinger of the future. US policy toward Iran is 
the perfect example of America’s split policy personality. Al-
though the US unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear 
agreement that it negotiated and is directly challenging the 
Iran regime, US Secretary of State Pompeo hurried to Brussels 
to confer with his EU colleagues to seek support of US policy 
objectives. EU policy on Iran has already separated itself from 
the US in some ways but has ultimately succumbed to some 
extent to US pressure on the Iranian regime.   
There will likely be a growing list of policy areas – Syria, Vene-
zuela, Israel – where there will be strong impulses for Europe 
and the US to go their separate transatlantic ways as great 
power competition and its regional manifestations become 
more urgent, and old multilateral structures and institutions 
seem more unable to respond. In an era described by French 
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President Macron as “the end of Western hegemony”, there 
is a greater drive toward re-thinking the global order. A new 
international system should rely on the principles of open-
ness, transparency and unity, which run counter to authoritar-
ian regimes. The US and Europe, in cooperation with the de-
mocracies of the Indo-Pacific and Western Hemisphere, can 
help construct this new order but only by tempering their own 
impulses of protectionism, anti-democratic methods and self-
isolationism. Such a new system must be borne from the in-
ternal confidence of strong and well-functioning democracies; 
not democracies that fear the future. Yet, it is this fear and a 
poverty of new ideas that make many in Europe and the US 
cleave to the crumbling structures.  
Can the EU develop ideas for such structures or will if fall back 
on tired mantras of ‘more of the same’? Will the US return its 
role of a benign global hegemon in exchange for more inter-
national support for global goods or will it retreat to its ‘splen-
did’ isolationism? The answers to these questions will deter-
mine what the future is going to look like. 
Though our long, 70-year holiday from history may be over, 
there remains an urgent need to build a new international sys-
tem based on the founding principles of the current order but 
infused with far greater dynamism, flexibility, optimism, and 
democratic unity of purpose to meet the great challenges of 
the 21st century.   
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